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ONE MAN-ONE VOTE IN THE SELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATING DELEGATES BY STATE PARTY CONVENTIONS
If any conclusion can safely be drawn from the presidential nominating
conventions of 1968, it is that the success of potential third party move-
ments looms as a substantial threat to the traditional two party system in
the United States.' To a large degree, this fact may be attributed to the
lack of balanced voter participation inherent in the nominating processes
now employed by the two major parties. This lack of participation has
engendered a sense of futility in the minds of the individual party members,
causing them to limit their support for the slate of candidates their party
ultimately chooses.'
The political parties, despite an awareness of the problems of voter frus-
tration, have been characteristically slow to change their representative
machinery' and to offer new initiatives toward presidential nomination.4
I Governor George Wallace received over 10% of the popular vote in the 1968
presidential election, and followers of Senator Eugene McCarthy threatened even
a fourth party. Dissatisfaction with the results of the nominating conventions was
also evidenced by the large number of credentials contests. See Schmidt & Whalen,
Credentials Contests at the 1968-rnd 1972-Democratic National Conventions, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1438 (1969).
In two recent voting rights cases, the Supreme Court has facilitated the achievement
of third party status by major party dissidents. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
2A distinctive feature of the politics of 1968 was the intense anti-administration
sentiment shared by many voters, and at the same time a willingness to express
this dissent through the traditional elective channels. Perhaps it was this anxious con-
cem that made the ineffectiveness of the national conventions especially tragic.
See CoAL.tssioz; ON PARY SmRucrmu AND DELwATE SErECnoN, MANDATE FOR
REo m 14 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McGovuEN CoMAn'N REP.].
a The party system has traditionally existed independently of judicial and legisla-
tive control. Until recently, the legal status of the parties has been in doubt, mak-
ing the application of constitutional concepts uncertain. Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45 (1935). But of. note 9 infra. Furthermore, the national party is not geared to
exercise of firm control over state party activities because of limited personnel and
resources. Pertinent policy decisions are possible only every four years when the
national convention is convened. The tendency has been to leave the state parties
to their own devices so long as they offer support to party presidential candidates.
4The process leading to nomination is begun at the state level with the selection
of delegations to the national party conventions. Currently there are three broad
systems of delegate selection: election by direct primary, election by party con-
vention, and appointment by party officials. Variations or combinations of these
systems by state parties are common, i.e., 60% of Virginia's 65 man delegation to
the 1968 Democratic National Convention was chosen under a state convention
process and the remaining 40% were appointees of the state chairman. McGovmNu
CoMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 63. The scope of this Note will not include a
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Furthermore, the ideal solution-an open national convention providing
uninhibited individual influence in the nominating process-is impractical.
Fortunately, the federal courts have begun to apply constitutional safeguards
to the selection of delegates to the national conventions, thereby insuring
more equal representation and a greater degree of involvement by the indi-
vidual party member.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES IN STATE ELECTIONS
Judicial intervention in the realm of state party election procedures has
been predicated on the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. The theories
advanced have been based on the equal protection clause and the right
of a citizen to vote irrespective of race.6 It is settled that no racially dis-
criminatory practice can exclude minorities from state controlled primaries.
In United States v. Classic,7 the Supreme Court, recognizing the political
reality that a Democratic nomination in Louisiana was tantamount to elec-
tion, upheld the right of a qualified Negro voter to have his state primary
ballot counted.' Furthermore, in Smith v. Allwright, the Court invalidated
a Texas Democratic Party procedure whereby non-whites were excluded
from the party primary. 0 The Allwright case erased any doubt concerning
comparative analysis of the three methods of delegate selection, but will focus
primarily on the state convention system. For such an analysis see Chambers &
Rotunda, Reform of Presidential Nominating Conventions, 56 VA. L. REV. 179,
182-91 (1970).
5The fourteenth amendment was recognized in the "reapportionment cases" as
a protectionary force which might insure that voters would not have their votes
"diluted" by political structures designed to favor particular interest groups. Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
IGU.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. This amendment was first applied to state and
intraparty elective practices in the "white primary cases." Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Baskin v. Brown, 174
F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
1 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
8 It was determined that election commissioners, conducting a primary election
under Louisiana law, had rejected registered voters at the Democratic primary.
Mr. Justice Stone stated:
Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure
of choice, or where in fact the primary effectively controls the choice, the right
of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included
in the right protected by Article I, § 2. Id. at 318.
9 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
1oSmith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295
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whether a primary for selection of federal officials was subject to federal
control.
The decision in Baker v. Carr" has given rise to a firm judicial commit-
ment to eradicate all methods of vote dilution in both local12 and state'
elections. While not directly concerned with party elections, 4 Baker clearly
included within its dictate those representative party procedures which
would constitute state action.'" The Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders"
utilized the rationale set forth in the legislative apportionment controversies
to overturn Georgia's county unit system"7 which, in the end result, weighed
rural votes more heavily than urban votes. In this initiation of the "one
man-one vote" concept founded upon the equal protection clause,'" Mr.
U.S. 45 (1935), which, in ruling upon the policy established by a state party con-
vention to exclude Negroes from party primaries, had held that to deny a vote in
a primary was a mere refusal of party membership with which "the state need
have no concern." Id. at 55. See pp. 353-55 infra.
"L 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12For cases dealing with county election plans, see Simon v. Lafayette Parish
Police Jury, 226 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. La. 1964); Bianchi v. Griffing, 217 F. Supp.
166 (ED.N.Y. 1963); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 60 Cal. 2d 318, 384 P.2d 421,
33 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1963). See also Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportion-
ment Decisions on Counties and Other Form7s of Municipal Govermnent, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 21 (1965). For a case dealing with city election standards, see Ellis v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965).
'
3
see, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curian,
382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated as mzoot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966). But see Thigpen v. Meyers,
231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Wash. 1964).
'4 In Baker v. Carr the Supreme Court determined that qualified voters under a
Tennessee legislative apportionment statute had been denied equal protection of
the laws by virtue of the debasement of their votes. A reapportionment of legisla-
tive representation had not taken place in over 60 years, which worked to the
detriment of urban voters as urban areas had experienced considerable expansion.
369 U.S. 186, 188-94 (1962). The decision was especially significant in establishing
that an apportionment controversy presented a justiciable constitutional cause of
action, not to be restricted by the political question doctrine. See pp. 352-53 infra.
15 See pp. 353-55 infra.
16 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
1  In Georgia the county unit was used as a basis for counting votes in the primary
election for statewide offices. Every qualified voter was given one vote, but the
candidate for nomination who received the greatest number of votes in the county
was assigned the county's unit vote, without any consideration of the minority vote.
A plurality of the county unit vote determined the statewide outcome. Id. at 371-72.
Is Whether the principle of "one man-one vote" in the state elections was properly
elevated to the stature of a constitutional standard is a question of continuing
academic debate. See, e.g., Auerbach, The Reapportiomznent Cases: One Person,
One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 1.
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Justice Douglas concluded that "[o]nce the geographical unit for which a
representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the elec-
tion are to have an equal vote. ... " 19 It was made clear that a popular
election need not involve the total state electorate to warrant fourteenth
amendment protection, but rather might involve only intraparty elections.
Unfortunately, Gray failed to determine whether the "one man-one vote"
standard would be similarly appropriate if the convention system were used
for nominating candidates rather than the primary system.2"
II. OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Although given these prominent constitutional inroads into state elective
methods, the courts have been hesitant to intervene in the field of conven-
tion delegate selection as it pertains to the process of nomination. Histori-
cally, two substantial obstacles have arisen to such judicial determination-
nonjusticiability and a failure to demonstrate state action.
A. Nonjusticiability
The courts have generally been reluctant to interfere with the internal
affairs of political parties.21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Colegrove v. Green,22
characterized a voter reapportionment controversy as a "political thicket"
to be avoided as, in his view, the Court was being asked to choose among
competing political philosophies, and such an issue should be resolved in
a nonjudicial forum. 22 However, the landmark decision in Baker v. Carr
overruled Colegrove by holding that gross malapportionment in legislative
districts constituted a deprivation of equal protection under the fourteenth
19 372 U.S. at 379.
20 Id. at 378 n.10.
21See Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965). The court refused to
acknowledge that equal protection of the law had been denied a Democratic party
member in Pennsylvania when precinct unit voting was used to elect the party's
county chairmen. The county chairmen served mere administrative functions within
the party organization, whereas "one man-one vote" applied to the choice of
elected representatives in the conduct of government. No basis was found in this
internal party matter to extend constitutional protection.
However, the court noted that the
. .. [cihoice of delegates to party national conventions for the nomination of
candidates for President and Vice President would seem logically to be covered
by the plaintiff's view of the reach of the equal protection clause.
id. at 372 n.5.
22 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
23 Id. at 556.
24 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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amendment which raised a justiciable issue. Baker created a novel approach
to the political question doctrine, which requires the identification and
availability of judicially manageable standards for adjudication." Distin-
guishing between "political questions" and "political cases," the Court
established that claims based on personal political rights, in contrast to
guaranty clause" claims, are justiciable in nature." The Baker decision,
in recognizing that relief under the equal protection clause was not im-
periled because discrimination related to political rights, exposed conven-
tion delegate selection to the potential regulatory power of the federal courts,
regardless of its highly political nature. Inasmuch as the method of delegate
selection reflects the individual's degree of involvement in the nomination
process, a denial of equal participation would affect personal political rights
and seemingly create a justiciable claim as a violation of equal protection
of the laws.
B. State Action
The state action requirement has been a further obstacle to a constitu-
tional determination of selection procedures for presidential nominating con-
vention delegates. It is well established that the fourteenth amendment
2 5 In redefining the political question concept, the Supreme Court set forth the
following requisites, any one of which could support a finding of a non justiciable
political issue:
a.) A constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
b.) A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
c.) The obvious need for an initial policy determination by a non judicial body;
d.) The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
e.) An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made;
f.) The potential embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. Id. at 217.
26 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government... .. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
Challenges have been made to various forms of state action seeling judicial determi-
nation based on the guaranty clause. The Supreme Court has consistently refused
to establish it as the source of a constitutional standard for invalidating state action
because ". . it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established
one in a State." Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1848). See also Highland
Farms Diary v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro-
politan Park District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U.S. 219 (1917); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). But cf.
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253
U.S. 221 (1920).
27 369 U.S. at 217-34. See note 26 supra.
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applies only to "state action" or action taken under color of state au-
thority.2" Nevertheless, state action as a requisite for application of constitu-
tional safeguards ". . . is shrinking as a factor of deterrent influence in the
area of discrimination." 29 There has been little difficulty in locating state
action in those instances where state statuatory regulation of primaries and
political parties has permitted equal protection violations.3" Yet, to restrict
the state action concept to cases involving state primary or convention
statutes would be to ignore the facts that primaries and party conventions
are an integral part of the state election machinery,3 and that political
parties have, in effect, become "state institutions" with or without specific
statuatory authorization.3 Accepting this premise, the conclusion is in-
escapable that the state's tolerance of an unrepresentative party elective
procedure would constitute an equal protection violation justifying judicial
intervention. Certainly a balancing of the relevant interests behind the state
action limitation would favor the voting public's right to determine who
the candidates at the general election are to be, as opposed to the political
party's interest in maintaining the status quo.33
2 8 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2 9 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 41 (8th Cir. 1967). See United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See generally
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); St. Antoine,
Color Blindness but not Myopia: A New Look At State Action, Equal Protection,
and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH. L. REv. 993 (1961); Note, Strange
Career of "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448
(1965).
SOTerry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Alhvright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
31 This is not a modern insight. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1886 com-
mented upon the unity of nomination and election:
Under our frame of government a vast system of political machinery has
grown up by which elections have been for many years practically controlled.
It is so far-reaching in its effect that the people have in many instances little to
do with the polls beyond the ratification of what had already been done by
nominating conventions .... Primary elections and nominating conventions have
now become a part of our great political system, and are welded and riveted
into it so firmly as to be difficult of separation.
Leonard v. Commonwealth ex rel. Cassidy, 112 Pa. 607, 4 A. 220, 225 (1886). See
Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285-86 (1921).
3 2 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Mr. Justic Black, while invalidating
a primary conducted by the Jaybird Democratic Association because it excluded
Negro voters, stated:
When a state structures its electoral apparatus in a form which devolves upon
a political organization the uncontested choice of public officials, that organiza-
tion itself, in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which
draw the Constitution's safeguards into play. Id. at 484.
33 It has been suggested that a search for the respective interests of the parties
[Vol. 5 :349
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Not all courts have readily adopted this expanded view of state action.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Irish v.
Democratic Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota34 stated that an "attitude
of non-interference is an appropriate starting point" '35 when the selection
of Minnesota's delegates to the Democratic National Convention by action
of party organization following properly apportioned county conventions
was challenged on the basis of the "one man-one vote" principle." A similar
constitutional challenge to the delegate selection process of the Georgia
Democratic Party was set aside in Smith v. State Democratic Executive
Committee" because no action by the state was involved and no state officer
was concerned. The criteria for a finding of state action should be consistent
whether a state primary or a state party convention is under judicial exami-
nation. Therefore, the soundest approach would be to follow the rationale
of Smith v. Allwright"8 and conclude that once a political party function,
be it primary or convention, is viewed as part of the electorial process, it is
state action to which both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments39
equally apply.
involved might illuminate the state action inquiry. The political parties would
prefer to continue the elective process as it now functions, thereby eliminating
the administrative chaos that often accompanies change. The voter, on the other
hand, has a compelling need to participate in nomination of candidates as well as
cast a ballot at the general election. The state action limitation would appear
even less viable under this balancing scheme when the probable consequences of
the failure of judicial intervention in this area of political party organization are
considered; that is, a lack of party support and a further loss of confidence in the
elective process. See Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAr. L. REv. 3 (1961).
34 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
35 Id. at 120.
36 The Irish decision was formulated on other grounds than the failure of state
action, however. Application of "one man-one vote" was deemed inappropriate
when the alleged malapportionment resulted from action taken by properly elected
precinct delegates to the county conventions. Furthermore, the court denied relief
under the equal protection clause because there existed no judicially discoverable
and manageable standards, making this a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 121.
The limited time scheme in which relief was sought was also a factor in the
decision. See note 48 infra.
37 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
3 8 The Supreme Court in Snith v. Allu'right acknowledged the unitary character
of the electoral process and ". . . that state delegation to a party of the power
to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that
may make the party's action the action of the state." 321 U.S. at 660.
39 For a disscussion of state action as a requisite for application of the fifteenth
amendment see Note, Strange Career of State Action Under the Fifteenth Amendment,
74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965).
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III. APPLICATION OF "ONE MAN-ONE VOTE" TO PARTY CONVENTIONS
Conceding the expanded recognition afforded constitutional guarantees
with respect to state election procedures, and the erosion of the obstacles
of nonjusticiability and state action, there could be no logical suggestion
that these guarantees should apply to the presidential nomination process
only when a state primary is employed to select delegates to the national
conventions. The case of Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Com-
mittee4" extended "one man-one vote" to a state party convention, invalidat-
ing a procedure which seriously failed to provide for allocation of conven-
tion delegates on a rational population basis. The analogy between a state
primary system for nomination and a state convention process for nomina-
tion was so prominent that the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington could not ignore it."'
The Washington State Democratic Committee used a statewide conven-
tion system initiated by the election of county convention delegates at pre-
cinct caucuses. Subsequently, county conventions elected their allocated
number of state convention delegates. 2 The formula applied by the state
committee to apportion the state convention delegates votes was deemed an
equal protection violation. The committee alloted a certain number of dele-
gates for each county irrespective of population. Each county also received
five delegates for each state senatorial district within its limits or, if a district
covered more than one county, one delegate for each 20% of the county's
population making up that district. Furthermore, the formula called for a
variable award of delegate votes to the county depending upon the degree
of success enjoyed by the party's presidential nominee in the last election. 3
At the state level, congressional district caucuses, comprised of state con-
vention delegates from the counties making up the particular congressional
district, were convened to elect national convention delegate nominees.
Ratification of these nominees by the state convention followed. The Wash-
ington state delegation to the Democratic National Convention was rounded
out by the appointment of ex officio delegates by the state Democratic
chairman.4
The state committee's formula indicated little concern with making the
allocation of delegates reflective of the voting populace. The county was the
40 319 F. Supp. 673 (WD. Wash. 1970).
41 ld. at 678.
42 Id. at 675-76.
43 Id. at 675.
44 There was no challenge presented concerning the ex officio delegates. Id. at 676.
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base unit around which delegate votes were assigned, with any variance
in population taken into account only by those few delegates assigned when
the county was a portion of a larger state senatorial district. The disparities
of representation among party members were obvious, 5 resulting in a
serious lessening of the ability of voters in the more populous counties to
participate in selecting the delegation to the national nominating conven-
tion.
The court in Maxey summarily dismissed the defendant committee's
contention that no judicially manageable standards existed for resolving the
dispute. The Baker case, in restricting the political question doctrine, had
called for a determination of whether ".... the duty asserted can be judicially
identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for
the right asserted can be judicially molded."46 The defendants did not deny
the grossly unrepresentative nature of the delegate selection formula used
by the state committee in Washington. The court determined, therefore, that
judicial review would be no more difficult with respect to delegate selection
formulae than it has been for state reapportionment." The fact that the
elective process complained of would not be effectuated until the 1972 con-
vention would not affect the rights of the plaintiffs to sue, because their
rights were presently endangered and time would be necessary to implement
the court's decision."8 Also, it was deemed immaterial that Washington state
45 1t was not disputed that, at the 1968 state convention, each delegate from King
County, Washington represented approximately 2,800 total voters and 670 Democratic
voters based on 1964 presidential returns, while each San Juan County delegate
represented 420 total voters and 125 Democrats. Id.
46 369 US. at 198. See pp. 352-53 supra.
47 319 F. Supp. at 677.
48 But see Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
The plaintiffs sought a reallocation of votes among delegates to the 1969 Democratic
National Convention and were denied relief partly because there was insufficient
time to effectuate the court's decision. The case was decided on August 13, 1968
and the convention was to begin August 26, 1968. Rather than forcing the issue
by judicial decree, it was noted that in many reapportionment cases the courts
have moved cautiously. "[Tihe attitude has been one of reluctance and of willingness
to have the challenged body initially given the opportunity to attempt to reorganize
itself." Id. at 120. See also note 36 supra.
The Maxey court adopted the same approach, but concluded that as the Washington
State Democratic Committee had been using the challenged delegate selection formula
since 1920, there could be no assurance that it would change before the 1972 national
convention. Therefore, the fact that a selection formula for 1972 had not been
announced should not jeopardize the right to relief. 319 F. Supp. at 677. Cf. Moore
v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 (1963).
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law49 did not authorize a specific method of delegate apportionment to be
used by the state committee.5"
Rejecting the traditional arguments made by the defendant committee,5'
the Maxey court ruled that the "one man-one vote" concept necessitates a
selection of state and county convention delegates other than by geo-
graphical subdivisions of the state. By diluting the votes of urban party
members while placing greater weight on those of rural voters, the party
had hampered full involvement in the nominating process to the same extent
that a similar urban-rural malapportionment had denied equal protection in
Gray v. Sanders.52 If the national convention delegates were chosen in
Washington by party primaries which weighed some votes over others, "one
man-one vote" would clearly be relevant. There is no disparity in applying
the same concept to the convention system, as both procedures serve the
49The legislature of Washington has delegated the following authority to political
party groups within the state:
Authority-Generally. Each political party shall have the power to:
(1) Make its own rules and regulations;
(2) Call conventions;
(3) Elect delegates to conventions, state and national;
(4) Fill vacancies on the ticket;
(5) Provide for the nomination of presidential electors; and
(6) Perform all functions inherent in such an organization:
Provided, That in no instance shall any convention have the power to nominate
any candidate to be voted for at any primary election. RCW § 29.42.010 (1965).
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-172 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
50 Specific statutory authority is not required for a finding of state action in
party elective practices so long as the parties have assumed a state function. 319
F. Supp. at 677-78.
Regulation of presidential nominating procedures cannot be said to be an inherent
state function, but rather one that has been adopted.
While it is true that the constitutional scheme for electing the President creates
no right of popular participation, all states have created such a right. Once the
state has undertaken to provide for popular elections, all votes must be equally
valued. Id. at 679.
51 The defendant committee argued the lack of a justiciable issue as well as the
absence of plaintiffs' standing to sue. It was further suggested that "one man-one vote"
is satisfied in the initial voting procedures at the precinct level, but the Maxey
Court observed that
[i]f the teachings of the Reynolds and Gray cases could be subverted simply
by imposing an unrepresentative convention hierarchy upon a system which
requires equal voting only at the lowest level, the one-man-one-vote principle
would be illusory. Id. at 680.
Further contentions of defendant which were rejected were that the party's
interest in a strong organization was overriding, and that the party represented
ideas, not population. Id. at 681.
52 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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same function-sending nominating delegates to the national party con-
ventions. 3
This holding acknowledged the indispensable role that nomination of
candidates plays in the total elective process." However, the previous judi-
cial tendency to leave the manner of delegate selection to the discretion
of state political party organizations implied that nomination and election
were independent steps. The privilege of casting a ballot was to be jealously
protected, but the authority to choose who would be on that ballot was
considered to be a power within the province of the party, to be dispensed
to the party members as seen fit. The old view ignored the great influence
exercised by the political parties, and that election to office without a party
nomination is nearly impossible in modem politics.55 Considering the strength
of party associations, any alternatives in the choice of candidates are very
often denied to the party member if he is refused a voice in nomination.
The decisions in United States v. Classic5" and Moore v. Moore5" supported
the more modem position by applying constitutional guarantees to primary
procedures inasmuch as a vote in a general election is meaningless without
a corresponding participation in the nominating procedure. This realization
is especially crucial in light of the volatile climate in which politics must
presently function:
The presidential nominating process can and should be one of the most
readily available and most effective means of accomplishing significant
political change in this country. Close constitutional scrutiny therefore
is in order wherever state and party procedures offer the voter something
less than the fullest possible participation in the nominating process.58
The Maxey decision placed some limitation on judicial intervention in
the presidential nomination process beyond the formative stages of the
63 If the statement of the Supreme Court in Gray that "the concept of political
equality in the voting booth contained in the Fifteenth Amendment extends to all
phases of state elections" (emphasis added), 372 U.S. at 380, 83 S. Ct. at 808, has
meaning, it must apply to those phases of state elections in which candidates are
nominated by the convention system as well as to those in which candidates are
nominated by primary elections. 319 F. Supp. at 679.
54 Id. at 678.
55 This basic political truth was set forth by the Supreme Court in Newberry
v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285-286 (1921).
56 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
57 229 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ala. 1964).
5SMaxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673, 678-79
(W.D. Wash. 1970).
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county and state conventions by stating that where a convention system
is employed, the elective process is initiated when the state committee allo-
cates delegates to the state convention." A companion case, Dahl v. Republi-
can State Committee,"0 refused to apply "one man-one vote" to the election
of the party state committee in that the election process had not yet begun
at this level of political involvement. A vital distinction was made between
the functions of the primarily administrative state committees and the repre-
sentative, governmental nature of the state party conventions."1 The internal
workings of a political party were at issue, a matter beyond the authority
of the judiciary to determine,6 2 and any attempted reorganization would
consequently be the legislature's responsibility.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "MAxEY" RULE
Accepting the incorporation of the "one man-one vote" concept into the
state party convention system, how might the standard be met? The consti-
tutional goal to be achieved is the alleviation of diluted votes which
debase the effectiveness of any expression of "grass roots" preference as to
presidential candidates. The percentage of delegates to the national party
conventions supporting a given candidate should very nearly approximate
the degree of support that candidate has at the local level." In Maxey it
was decided that a formula based on either total population or total party
membership as determined by Democratic vote in the last presidential elec-
tion should satisfy the equal vote requirement." However, a gross popula-
59 Id. at 679.
'O 310 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
61The Dahl court relied upon the decision of Sailors v. Board of Education, 387
U.S. 105 (1967), in which the Supreme Court refused to apply "one man-one vote" to
the selection of a county school board because of the nonlegislative character of
the body. So also, the party's state committee is primarily administrative and the
election of the state committee could not be said to be an integral part of the
presidential election process. The Maxey decision determined that this election
machinery is activated when the state committee allocates delegates to the county
conventions. Therefore, at the phase where state committees are being organized,
the presidential nomination process has yet to begin. Id. at 684.
62 See also Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
63 Presumably, this might be accomplished by alleviating all types of discrimination
now inherent in delegate selection, thereby making the state delegation reflective
of the state party electorate. The need for reform in this area is painfully obvious.
For instance, of the 2,666 delegates and alternates who attended the 1968 Republican
National Convention, only 2.4% were black, 1% were under the age of 30, and 17%
were women. MCGOVERN COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 26.
04 319 F. Supp. at 679.
[Vol. 5 :349
ONE MAN-ONE VOTE
tion basis for representation would be inadequate when party votes, and
not apportionment, are involved. Political party activity varies among legis-
lative districts and, consequently, some minor discrimination would result
against active party members in the party's most loyal districts. The more
ideal criterion for establishing "one man-one vote" guidelines is party mem-
bership,6" which disregards those voters whose views are not meaningful
in the party's nomination process. The voters who are afforded equal repre-
sentation should be those most directly interested in the success of the
party's presidential candidate and best able to make an intelligent choice.
Party membership could be determined either by party votes cast in a
previous election or party registration. " Use of registration figures would
yield a formula based on a more current and responsive electorate, pre-
sumably better advised on pending party issues."7 No drastic structural
change need be made to those voting districts, precinct or county, which
presently base delegate selection on gross population figures so as to reflect
party membership. Rather, allocation of delegates could be predicated on
the proportion of party members in that district in relation to state-wide
party membership. 8 It could then be said that under the state convention'
system of nomination, a more balanced representation for all party mem-
bers has been achieved.
Whether the state convention system for selecting national delegates is
of sufficient worth to justify reform, irrespective of "one man-one vote,"
is another related question. Popular balloting in the precinct or county
under this system, is often conducted at a time when the political evolution
of issues and candidates culminating at the national convention is in its
formative stages."9 Consequently, the party voter has no realistic oppor-
65 Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
06 See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966).
67 While it might be argued that votes for the party candidate in the last state-
wide general election would more accurately reflect party strength, use of registra-
tion figures would be more indicative of ideological preferences and more responsive
to effective political organization. However, party registration might have the effect
of limiting the electorate and, thereby, the "grass roots" involvement in the nomina-
tion process. State parties might chose their own standard so long as no invidious
discrimination results.
68 Such a procedure would eliminate the need for chaotic redistricting of the party
organization. The balance between urban and rural interests with respect to internal
party matters would not be disrupted. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
69 The McGovern Commission reported that over 30% of the delegates to the
1968 Democratic National Convention had been selected before Senator Eugene
McCarthy announced his candidacy, and that formal delegate selection steps had
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tunity within this time scheme to inform himself and to express a mean-
ingful preference. Certainly, the limited enthusiasm and participation on
the precinct level many months prior to the formal initiation of the presi-
dential campaign is not indicative of the voters' evolving interest and concern
as the campaign issues unfold. The inadequacies of the state convention
could be eliminated by a nationwide system of state party primaries, allow-
ing voters to select delegates directly rather than through the stratified party
structure. National conventions would then be directly representative of the
voters' desires on both issues and candidates. State party primaries would
in no way alter the traditional function of the national convention."
The national parties have not been completely unaware of the manifest
need for reform of the presidential nomination machinery." The Demo-
cratic Party, following the 1968 convention debacle, appointed the Com-
mission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection chaired by Senator
George S. McGovern, to assist the state parties in a reformative effort. The
McGovern Commission adopted official guidelines for delegate selection
which went beyond an endorsement of equal apportionment and decried
other abusive state party methods."2 As to apportionment, the Commission
established that at least 75% of the total state delegation must be selected
below the congressional district level and that the apportionment formula
must be based on gross population or some measure of party strength.7"
Whether these guidelines, and those being considered by the Republicans,
will be effective in restoring the credibility of the delegate selection process
is uncertain. If the parties fail in their reformation attempts, invalidation of
begun in all but 12 states when President Lyndon Johnson declared that he was not
a candidate. McGovEmR COMM'N REP. supra note 2, at 30.
7OThe national convention serves the necessary purpose of encouraging party
debate and a formulation of a party platform. Without the opportunity to reconcile
party differences and gather support which the national convention provides, the
fall presidential campaigns would digress into greater confusion. It is not suggested
that the national convention be replaced, but only that delegates be chosen in a
democratic manner.
71The delegates of the 1968 Democratic National Convention passed a resolution
calling for "full and timely opportunity to participate in nominating candidates;" more
specifically, elimination of the unit rule in delegate selection and assurance that this
selection process take place within the calendar year of the national convention.
McGoVERN COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 15.
72The McGovern Commission forbade, among other practices, proxy voting and
the unit rule, limited mandatory assessments of delegates and required that party
meetings be held on uniform dates in public places after adequate public notice
has been given.
73 McGovEmq COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 45.
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their present procedures by the courts or regulation by Congress74 are less
attractive alternatives.
V. 'CoNcLUSION
Regardless of the method employed, the voter is demanding an increas-
ing influence in the presidential nomination. The federal courts have em-
barked upon a course designed to protect the voter's full participation in
the election process, including both nomination and the general ballots.
Although the courts will undoubtedly continue to apply "one man-one
vote" to the nominating process, it is extremely doubtful that change wrought
by judicial intervention alone will abate the sense of alienation experienced
by a growing segment of the electorate. The political parties are most able
to restore public confidence in the elective process by providing the indi-
vidual a greater voice in party presidential nominations. The Maxey deci-
sion calls for equal representation of party members when delegates to
county and state party conventions are convened to select state delegations
to the national conventions. A better approach would be to designate these
state delegations through a state party primary, thereby insuring the voter
uninhibited involvement in the nomination process. Whatever approach is
taken, the need for reform is immediate, as the issue embraces the very
foundation of democracy-the right to vote.
C.F.W.
74 See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The Court established that
Congress has an inherent power "to preserve the purity of presidential and vice
presidential elections." Id. at 544. If the viability of the traditional two party system
were endangered, Congress might move to afford statuatory assurances that party
procedures would not deny an equal protection of the laws in presidential nomination.
Congressional intervention might also be predicated on the influence of the national
conventions on interstate commerce. The regulatory authority of Congress has
bwen extended over non-commercial instrumentalities so long as they function in
interstate commerce. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Nevertheless,
Congress has been unwilling to enter this political arena.
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